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Journal article

Health Service Gatekeepers.

Abstract:

Incentive contracts for gatekeepers who control patient access to specialist medical services provide too-weak incentives to investigate cost further when the expected cost of treatment is greater than the benefit. Making gatekeepers residual claimants with a fixed fee from which treatment costs must be met (as with full insurers who are themselves gatekeepers) provides too-strong incentives when the expected cost is less than the benefit. Giving patients the choice between a gatekeeper with ...

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Journal:
RAND Journal of Economics More from this journal
Volume:
35
Publication date:
2004-01-01
ISSN:
0741-6261
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:224a95d0-8249-4594-b897-4cd10f202bad
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11367
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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