Working paper icon

Working paper

Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games

Abstract:

We study evolutionary dynamics in assignment games where many agents interact anonymously at virtually no cost. The process is decentralized, very little information is available and trade takes place at many different prices simultaneously. We propose a completely uncoupled learning process that selects a subset of the core of the game with a natural equity interpretation. This happens even though agents have no knowledge of other agents' strategies, payoffs, or the structure of the game,...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher:
University of Oxford
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2012-06-01
Paper number:
607
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1143815
Local pid:
pubs:1143815
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP