Journal article
The welfare diffusion objection to prioritarianism
- Abstract:
- According to the Welfare Diffusion Objection, we should reject Prioritarianism because it implies the ‘desirability of welfare diffusion’: the claim that it can be better for there to be less total wellbeing spread thinly between a larger total number of people, rather than for there to be more total wellbeing, spread more generously between a smaller total number of people. I argue that while Prioritarianism does not directly imply the desirability of welfare diffusion, Prioritarians are nevertheless implicitly committed to certain principles for comparing different-number populations which, together with the Prioritarian same-person axiology, imply the desirability of welfare diffusion.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 419.7KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/S0266267122000190
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Economics and Philosophy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 40
- Issue:
- 1
- Pages:
- 55-76
- Publication date:
- 2022-11-14
- Acceptance date:
- 2022-04-23
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1474-0028
- ISSN:
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0266-2671
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1312196
- Local pid:
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pubs:1312196
- Deposit date:
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2023-06-22
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Tomi Francis
- Copyright date:
- 2022
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Cambridge University Press at: 10.1017/S0266267122000190
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