Privacy, adoption, and truthful reporting: a simple theory of contact tracing applications

Journal article

This paper analyzes the trade-offs associated with the deployment of contact tracing applications to support policy responses in a pandemic. In many jurisdictions, the government cannot force individuals to adopt such applications. We therefore analyze a simple model that highlights the importance of individuals’ incentives to voluntarily adopt a reporting application and reveal their infection status to the government who can then undertake contact monitoring. We discuss the consequences of various policy options, such as security, communication and anonymization policies, in terms of the size and representativeness of the sample of infection data that contract tracing applications generate.

Authors: de Montjoye, Y-A; Ramadorai, T; Valletti, T; Walther, A

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Economics Letters
• Volume: 198
• Article number: 109676
• Publication date: 2020-11-25
• Acceptance date: 2020-11-23
• DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109676
• EISSN: 1873-7374
• ISSN: 0165-1765
• Language: English
• Keywords: privacy; contact tracing apps; coronavirus; incentives