Journal article
Self and self-consciousness: Aristotelian ontology and Cartesian duality
- Abstract:
- The relationship between self-consciousness, Aristotelian ontology, and Cartesian duality is far closer than it has been thought to be. There is no valid inference either from considerations of Aristotle's hylomorphism or from the phenomenological distinction between body and living body, to the undermining of Cartesian dualism. Descartes' conception of the self as both a reasoning and willing being informs his conception of personhood; a person for Descartes is an unanalysable, integrated, self-conscious and autonomous human being. The claims that Descartes introspectively encounters the self and that the Cartesian extent of inner space is self-contained are profound errors, distortions through the lenses of modern theories.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Author's original, pdf, 29.0KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.01367.x
Authors
- Publisher:
- Wiley-Blackwell
- Journal:
- Philosophical Investigations More from this journal
- Volume:
- 32
- Issue:
- 2
- Pages:
- 134-162
- Publication date:
- 2009-04-01
- Edition:
- Author's Original
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1467-9205
- ISSN:
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0190-0536
- Language:
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English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:1fc25c55-a481-4ad0-96a0-28a52f78c8b7
- Local pid:
-
ora:2810
- Deposit date:
-
2009-06-04
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Blackwell Publishing Ltd
- Copyright date:
- 2009
- Notes:
- This is the pre-peer reviewed version of the following article: Christofidou, A. (2009). 'Self and self-consciousness: Aristotelian ontology and Cartesian duality', Philosophical Investigations, 32(2), 134-162, which has been published in final form at http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9205.2008.01367.x
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