Rapid Evolution under Inertia.

Journal article

This paper demonstrates that inertia driven by switching costs leads to more rapid evolution in a class of games that includes m × m pure coordination games. Under the best-response dynamic and a fixed rate of mutation, the expected waiting time to reach long-run equilibrium is of lower order in the presence of switching costs, due to the creation of new absorbing states that allow Ellison's [Ellison, G., 2000. Basins of attraction, long-run stochastic stability, and the speed of step-by-step evolution. Rev. Econ. Stud. 67, 17-45] "step-by-step" evolution to occur.

Authors: Norman, T

• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Volume: 66
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 865 - 879
• Publication date: 2009-01-01
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2008.10.002
• ISSN: 0899-8256
• Language: English