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Adaptive Play by Idiosyncratic Agents.

Abstract:

Equilibrium selection in coordination games has generated a large literature. Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) studied dynamic models of aggregate behaviour in which agents choose best responses to observations of population play. Crucially, infrequent mistakes (“mutations”) allow agents to take actions contrary to current trends and prevent initial configurations from determining long run play. An alternative approach is offered here: Harsanyian trembles are added to agents’ ...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2002-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:1f1fa2b6-6188-4462-ab42-27ff9a4abe46
Local pid:
ora:1126
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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