Divine psychology and cosmic fine-tuning

Journal article

After briefly outlining the fine-tuning argument (FTA), I explain how it relies crucially on the claim that it is not improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe. Against this premise stands the divine psychology objection: the contention that the probability that God would design a fine-tuned universe is inscrutable. I explore three strategies for meeting this objection: (i) denying that the FTA requires any claims about divine psychology in the first place, (ii) defining the motivation and intention to design a fine-tuned universe into the theistic hypothesis, and (iii) providing arguments that the relevant probability is not terribly low. While I reject the first two, I conclude, in line with the third, that considerations about life's objective value establish that it is not absurdly improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe, whether one regards the FTA as an inference merely to a cosmic designer, or to theism proper. Accordingly, the divine psychology objection fails.

Authors: Donahue, MK

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Cambridge University Press
• Journal: Religious Studies: An International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion
• Volume: 61
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 794-810
• Publication date: 2024-03-18
• Acceptance date: 2024-02-13
• DOI: 10.1017/s0034412524000088
• EISSN: 1469-901X
• ISSN: 0034-4125
• Language: English
• Keywords: fine-tuning argument; natural theology; inscrutability; design inferences; scepticism