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Regulating Financial Conglomerates

Abstract:

We investigate the optimal regulation of financial conglomerates which combine a bank and a non-bank financial institution. The conglomerate's risk-taking incentives depend upon the level of market discipline it faces, which in turn is determined by the conglomerate's liability strucure. We examine optimal capital requirements for standalone institutions, for integrated financial conglomerates, and for financial conglomerates that are structured as holding companies. For a given risk profile,...

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Publication date:
2007-01-01
UUID:
uuid:1d5f330b-2865-424d-9b06-800990cf4202
Local pid:
oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1679
Deposit date:
2011-12-13

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