Journal article
The basis of debasing scepticism
- Abstract:
- This paper purports to provide a fresh cashing out of Debasing Scepticism: the type of Scepticism put on the map in a recent article by Jonathan Schaffer, with a view to demonstrating that the Debasing Sceptic’s argument is not so easily dismissed as many of Schaffer’s commentators have thought. After defending the very possibility of the Debasing Sceptic’s favoured sceptical scenario, I lay out a framework for thinking of the agent’s power to hold their beliefs in the light of reasons which I argue has initial plausibility. I then attempt to show that with this framework in tow, the Debasing Sceptic has an argument for their sceptical conclusion available to them which Schaffer’s commentators have failed to undermine, and which is independently interesting.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Version of record, 802.9KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s10670-019-00133-2
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer Nature
- Journal:
- Erkenntnis More from this journal
- Issue:
- 2019
- Publication date:
- 2019-06-22
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-05-27
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1572-8420
- ISSN:
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0165-0106
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1038850
- Local pid:
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pubs:1038850
- Deposit date:
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2020-02-28
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Cunningham
- Copyright date:
- 2019
- Rights statement:
- © The Author(s) 2019. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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