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Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms.

Abstract:
We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We define and give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value (OEV) and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness, and truthfulness have on the achievable egalitarian value. Finally, we conduct detailed experiments analyzing the tradeoffs between efficiency with envy-freeness or truthfulness using two prominent random assignment mechanisms --- random serial dictatorship and the probabilistic serial mechanism --- for different classes of utility functions and distributions.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author

Publisher:
Association for Computing Machinery
Host title:
AAMAS 2016: International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Journal:
AAMAS 2016 More from this journal
Volume:
abs/1507.06827
Publication date:
2016-05-09
Acceptance date:
2016-01-25
ISSN:
1558-2914
ISBN:
9781450342391

Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:578434
UUID:
uuid:1bf1f548-d596-4431-bf2d-6427eff42a84
Local pid:
pubs:578434
Source identifiers:
578434
Deposit date:
2016-04-04
ARK identifier:

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