Conference item
Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms.
- Abstract:
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We consider the egalitarian welfare of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We define and give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal egalitarian value (OEV) and investigate the effect that different well-known properties like ordinality, envy-freeness, and truthfulness have on the achievable egalitarian value. Finally, we conduct detailed experiments analyzing the tradeoffs between efficienc...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 2.1MB)
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Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Association for Computing Machinery Publisher's website
- Journal:
- AAMAS 2016 Journal website
- Volume:
- abs/1507.06827
- Host title:
- AAMAS 2016: International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
- Publication date:
- 2016-05-09
- Acceptance date:
- 2016-01-25
- ISSN:
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1558-2914
- Source identifiers:
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578434
- ISBN:
- 9781450342391
Item Description
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:578434
- UUID:
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uuid:1bf1f548-d596-4431-bf2d-6427eff42a84
- Local pid:
- pubs:578434
- Deposit date:
- 2016-04-04
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
- Copyright date:
- 2016
- Notes:
- Copyright © 2016, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (www.ifaamas.org). All rights reserved.
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