Journal article
Avoiding risk and avoiding evidence
- Abstract:
-
It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance that is both widespread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk-avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable. In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemi...
Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 446.8KB)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305
Authors
Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Taylor and Francis Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy Journal website
- Volume:
- 98
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 495-515
- Publication date:
- 2020-03-13
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-07-31
- DOI:
- EISSN:
-
1471-6828
- ISSN:
-
0004-8402
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:1036430
- UUID:
-
uuid:1bb42154-9c07-4aa4-b016-2b7af5e88301
- Local pid:
- pubs:1036430
- Source identifiers:
-
1036430
- Deposit date:
- 2019-07-31
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © 2020 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Taylor and Francis at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305
Metrics
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record