Journal article icon

Journal article

Avoiding risk and avoiding evidence

Abstract:

It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance that is both widespread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk-avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable. In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemi...

Expand abstract
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

Actions


Access Document


Files:
Publisher copy:
10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305

Authors


More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Philosophy
Oxford college:
Magdalen College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Taylor and Francis
Journal:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
Volume:
98
Issue:
3
Pages:
495-515
Publication date:
2020-03-13
Acceptance date:
2019-07-31
DOI:
EISSN:
1471-6828
ISSN:
0004-8402
Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
pubs:1036430
UUID:
uuid:1bb42154-9c07-4aa4-b016-2b7af5e88301
Local pid:
pubs:1036430
Source identifiers:
1036430
Deposit date:
2019-07-31

Terms of use


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP