Journal article
Avoiding risk and avoiding evidence
- Abstract:
- It is natural to think that there is something epistemically objectionable about avoiding evidence, at least in ideal cases. We argue that this natural thought is inconsistent with a kind of risk-avoidance that is both widespread and intuitively rational. More specifically, we argue that if the kind of risk-avoidance recently defended by Lara Buchak is rational, avoiding evidence can be epistemically commendable. In the course of our argument we also lay some foundations for studying epistemic value, or accuracy, when considering risk-avoidant agents.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 446.8KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305
Authors
- Publisher:
- Taylor and Francis
- Journal:
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 98
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 495-515
- Publication date:
- 2020-03-13
- Acceptance date:
- 2019-07-31
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1471-6828
- ISSN:
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0004-8402
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:1036430
- UUID:
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uuid:1bb42154-9c07-4aa4-b016-2b7af5e88301
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1036430
- Source identifiers:
-
1036430
- Deposit date:
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2019-07-31
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Copyright date:
- 2020
- Rights statement:
- © 2020 Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Taylor and Francis at: https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1697305
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