Journal article
Competition, Agency and Productivity.
- Abstract:
- This article tests a set of hypotheses relating to agency and Schumpeterian views on how competition affects performance. A survey data set of Australian workplaces is used, with the change in labour productivity as the dependent variable. The results show strong support for the idea that intense competition raises productivity growth in managerial workplaces, but not in non-managerial workplaces (i.e. where the principal owner also works). Testing the agency theories in more detail, we find no evidence that the number of competitors, the price elasticity of demand or a proxy for bankruptcy (pre-tax losses) are the mechanisms behind the process. For non-managerial workplaces the results indicate support for the idea that greater demand uncertainty reduces productivity growth. In contrast, for managerial workplaces, greater demand uncertainty tends to raise productivity growth.
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- Files:
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(Preview, pdf, 77.0KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1080/1357151042000286447
Authors
- Publisher:
- Taylor and Francis
- Journal:
- International Journal of the Economics of Business More from this journal
- Volume:
- 11
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 349 - 367
- Publication date:
- 2004-01-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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1357-1516
- Language:
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English
- UUID:
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uuid:1ba9e70a-4f67-4f82-8866-42d682001dcd
- Local pid:
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oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12662
- Deposit date:
-
2011-08-15
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2004
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