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Multilateral Subsidy Games.

Abstract:

This paper examines the rationale for multilateral agreements to limit investment subsidies. The welfare ranking of symmetric multilateral subsidy games is shown to depend on whether or not investment levels are "friendly", raising rival profits in total, and/or strategic complements, raising rival profits at the margin. In both Cournot and Bertrand competition, when spillovers are low and competition is intense (because goods are close substitutes), national-welfare-maximizing governments wi...

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Dermot Leahy More by this author
J. Peter Neary More by this author
Volume:
346
Series:
Discussion Papers
Publication date:
2007
URN:
uuid:1b48f1f0-1284-4c16-92c3-934a9dcb461c
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12243
Language:
English

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