Why does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?

Journal article

Abstract In this paper, I ask why Aristotle thinks that ethical virtue (rather than mere self-control) is required for practical wisdom. I argue that a satisfactory answer will need to explain why being prone to bad appetites implies a failing of the rational part of the soul. I go on to claim that the self-controlled person does suffer from such a rational failing: a failure to take a specifically rational kind of pleasure in fine action. However, this still leaves a problem: could there not be someone who (unlike the self-controlled person) took the right kind of pleasure in fine action, but who failed to be virtuous on account of bad appetites? If so, would such a person be practically wise but not virtuous? I end with some suggestions about how Aristotle might answer this. © 2012 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden.

Authors: Coope, U

• Publication status: Published
• Journal: PHRONESIS-A JOURNAL FOR ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
• Volume: 57
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 142-163
• Publication date: 2012-01-01
• DOI: 10.1163/156852812X628998
• EISSN: 1568-5284
• ISSN: 0031-8868
• Language: English
• Keywords: self-control; ethical virtue; practical wisdom; reason