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Limiting Patentees' Market Power without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies.

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APA Style

Ayres, I., & Klemperer, P. (1999). Limiting Patentees' Market Power without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-injunctive Remedies. Michigan Law Review, 97.

MLA Style

Ayres, I, and P Klemperer. “Limiting Patentees' Market Power without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies.” Michigan Law Review, vol. 97, 1999.

Chicago Style

Ayres, I, and P Klemperer. 1999. “Limiting Patentees' Market Power without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies.” Michigan Law Review 97.
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Authors

+ Ayres, I More by this author

Role:: Author

+ Klemperer, P More by this author

Role:: Author

Journal:: Michigan law review More from this journal
Volume:: 97
Publication date:: 1999-01-01
ISSN:: 0026-2234

Language:: English
UUID:: uuid:1aa90534-6cbc-4dcf-b3cf-8ecf8e33e0df
Local pid:: oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:11108
Deposit date:: 2011-08-16
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_1aa905346cbc4dcfb3cf8ecf8e33e0df

Terms of use

Copyright date:: 1999

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

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