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Transparency, recruitment and retention in the public sector

Abstract:

This paper argues that government should pay greater heed to recruitment and retention when designing performance measurement systems for bureaucracies. In the face of pervasive rigidities in public sector pay, internal performance measurement rewards quitters and scars stayers and therefore makes it difficult to recruit and retain. Full and immediate publication of performance minimizes the cost of initial recruitment but entails retaining and paying rents to poor performers. This is optimal...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher:
University of Oxford Publisher's website
Series:
Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
Publication date:
2004-12-01
Paper number:
219
Keywords:
Pubs id:
1144222
Local pid:
pubs:1144222
Deposit date:
2020-12-15

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