Evolution and impartiality

Journal article

Lazari-Radek and Singer argue that evolutionary considerations can resolve Sidgwick’s dualism of practical reason, because such considerations debunk moral views that give weight to self-interested or partial considerations, but cannot threaten the principle Universal Benevolence. I argue that even if we grant these claims, this appeal to evolution is ultimately self-defeating. Lazari-Radek and Singer face a dilemma. Either their evolutionary argument against partial morality succeeds, but then we need to also give up our conviction that suffering is bad; or there is a way to defend this conviction, but then their argument against partiality fails. Utilitarians, I suggest, should resist the temptation to appeal to evolutionary debunking arguments.

Authors: Kahane, G

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Journal: Ethics
• Volume: 124
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 327-341
• Publication date: 2014-01-01
• Edition: Publisher's version
• DOI: 10.1086/673433
• EISSN: 1539-297X
• ISSN: 0014-1704
• Language: English
• Subjects: Ethics (Moral philosophy); Philosophy; Ethics of the biosciences; Practical ethics