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Sovereign Debt, Structural Adjustment, and Conditionality.

Abstract:

The lack of a proper enforcement mechanism for sovereign debt generates a commitment failure. As a result, a sovereign may seek to improve its position in debt renegotiations and thus evade its debt obligations by reducing exports. Conditionality seeks to provide a solution to the incentive problem by addressing the commitment failure. Formalizing this argument, we show that conditionality helps the repayment of sovereign debt. In certain circumstances, it can eliminate debt overhang, especia...

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Authors


Marcel Fafchamps More by this author
Journal:
Journal of Development Economics
Volume:
50
Publication date:
1996
URN:
uuid:180ce0dd-13e3-49ef-8d12-192c34ef9594
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:10869
Language:
English

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