Working paper
Job design and the benefits of private trade
- Abstract:
- We reconsider the job design theory of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991), to include career concerns considerations. When reputations are considered, discretion may play a more integral part of the incentive scheme. It can be a useful instrument to enhance incentives and prevent the adverse selection of low ability agents. We then show that these synergies are useful in explaining the employment of U.S. faculty members and the employment of agents in the English East India Company, an historically important firm.
- Publication status:
- Published
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 417.2KB, Terms of use)
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Authors
- Publisher:
- University of Oxford
- Series:
- Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 2004-09-01
- Paper number:
- 204
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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1144231
- Local pid:
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pubs:1144231
- Deposit date:
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2020-12-15
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2004
- Rights statement:
- Copyright 2004 The Author(s)
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