Prohairesis, voluntariness and virtue

Thesis

In the ethics of both Aristotle and Epictetus, prohairesis occupies a central role, relating ends, desire and action. Because Epictetus’s conception of prohairesis is founded upon Stoic psychology, its dissimilarity to Aristotle’s has often been emphasised. However, I contend that this view risks understating the connection between the two: Aristotle and Epictetus each maintain that prohairesis cannot be compelled, thus affording it great significance in defining autonomy, voluntariness of action and virtue of character. As Aristotle says, “people do bad things even when compelled to but no one decides under compulsion” (EE II.11, 1228a12–15).

Authors: Davies, T

• DOI: 10.5287/ora-obapkmba2
• Type of award: M.St.
• Level of award: Masters
• Awarding institution: University of Oxford
• Language: English