Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utilities and externalities

Working paper

We provide a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to solve games with non-transferable utilities and externalities. We show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegoiated. In the original game derived from these payoff configurations, we can find a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. For games without externalities this partition and the corrresponding payoffs constitute a strong Nash equilirium in a strategic form game with complete information. We use our model to provide a common framework for a variety of solutions for cooperative games, bargaining problems and bankruptcy problems.

Authors: Karos, D

• Publication status: Published
• Publisher: University of Oxford
• Series: Department of Economics Discussion Paper Series
• Publication date: 2015-02-20
• DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0487-5
• Paper number: 741
• Keywords: ordinal games; non-cooperative coalition formation; core stable partitions; bargaining with claims; games with non-transferable utilities in partition function form