Towards a hyperintensional theory of intrinsicality

Journal article

The distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties is an elusive distinction that has resisted precise formulation. This paper argues in favour of a hyperintensional analysis of intrinsicality that appeals to 'in virtue of' claims. It will be shown that accounts of intrinsicality that appeal to combinatorial and duplication principles do not yield satisfactory results, even when they are supplemented with a notion of 'naturalness'. We need to appeal to 'in virtue of' claims rather than to 'naturalness' in order (i) to allow for cases whereby a property is possessed both intrinsically and extrinsically, (ii) to adequately classify modal properties when these are given a counterpart-theoretic analysis, and (iii) to retain the idea that the set of intrinsic properties and the set of pure extrinsic properties are closed under Boolean operations. Moreover, the paper will argue in favour of treating the intrinsically/extrinsically distinction as more basic than the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction and explaining the latter in terms of the former.

Authors: Bader, R

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
• Journal: Journal of Philosophy
• Volume: 110
• Issue: 10
• Pages: 525-563
• Publication date: 2013-10-01
• EISSN: 1939-8549
• ISSN: 0022-362X
• Language: English
• Subjects: Philosophy