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Regularity and robustness in monotone Bayesian games

Abstract:
This paper defines regular and weakly regular equilibria for monotone Bayesian games with one-dimensional actions and types. It analyzes the robustness of equilibria with respect to perturbations. It also proves an index theorem and provides applications to uniqueness of equilibrium.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Department:
Oxford University
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Elsevier Publisher's website
Journal:
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Volume:
60
Pages:
145-158
Publication date:
2015-07-13
DOI:
EISSN:
1873-1538
ISSN:
0304-4068
Language:
English
Keywords:
Subjects:
UUID:
uuid:13868999-8b4f-46ac-a173-5a6d9adc2e9b
Deposit date:
2015-08-18

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