Journal article
Condorcet winning sets
- Abstract:
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An alternative is said to be a Condorcet winner of an election if it is preferred to any other alternative by a majority of voters. While this is a very attractive solution concept, many elections do not have a Condorcet winner. In this paper, we propose a set-valued relaxation of this concept, which we call a Condorcet winning set: such sets consist of alternatives that collectively dominate any other alternative. We also consider a more general version of this concept, where instead of domi...
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- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
-
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(Accepted manuscript, pdf, 383.4KB)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/s00355-014-0853-4
Authors
Funding
Nottingham Trent University
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Springer-Verlag Publisher's website
- Journal:
- Social Choice and Welfare Journal website
- Volume:
- 44
- Issue:
- 3
- Pages:
- 493-517
- Publication date:
- 2015-03-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0176-1714
Item Description
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:542673
- UUID:
-
uuid:137f85d5-324b-44d7-bb3c-ee1af81960f3
- Local pid:
- pubs:542673
- Source identifiers:
-
542673
- Deposit date:
- 2016-01-10
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Springer-Verlag
- Copyright date:
- 2015
- Notes:
- © 2014, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
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