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Sequential Decisions with Tests.

Abstract:

We consider a principal-agent problem where the principal wishes to be endorsed by a sequence of agents, but cannot truthfully reveal type. In the standard "herding" model, the agents learn from each other’s decisions, which can lead to cascades on a given decision when later agents’ private information is swamped. We augment the standard model to allow the principal to subject herself to a test designed to provide public information about her type. She must decide how tough a test to attempt...

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David Gill More by this author
Daniel Sgroi More by this author
Volume:
242
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2005
URN:
uuid:135787ae-2a78-4d73-8be3-fdebef02ee44
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:13292
Language:
English

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