Journal article
Is the Knowledge Argument a Frege Puzzle?
- Abstract:
- Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument claims that Mary—a neuroscientist who knows all the physical facts about color perception but has never seen color—learns something new when she sees red, posing a challenge to physicalism. While physicalists deny that Mary acquires knowledge of new facts, they must still explain her apparent epistemic progress. I argue that the intuition that Mary gains new knowledge upon seeing red stems from the alleged opacity of propositional attitude ascriptions—the same phenomenon underlying Frege puzzles.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Preview, Version of record, pdf, 185.0KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/can.2025.10049
Authors
+ Arts and Humanities Research Council
More from this funder
- Funder identifier:
- https://ror.org/0505m1554
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Canadian Journal of Philosophy More from this journal
- Pages:
- 1-17
- Publication date:
- 2025-12-26
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1911-0820
- ISSN:
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0045-5091
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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2360270
- UUID:
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uuid_12c3f7e9-5840-4445-a545-7780774ebece
- Local pid:
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pubs:2360270
- Source identifiers:
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3603796
- Deposit date:
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2025-12-26
- ARK identifier:
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Terms of use
- Copyright date:
- 2025
- Licence:
- CC Attribution (CC BY)
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