Journal article
Précis of "Vagueness"
- Abstract:
- The central thesis of the book is that the proposition a vague sentence expresses in a borderline case is true or false, and we cannot know which. We are ignorant of its truth-value. This is the epistemic view of vagueness. It allows us to preserve both classical logic and disquotational principles about truth and falsity, with all their advantages: simplicity, clarity, power, past success, integration with well-confirmed theories in other domains. Consequently, the epistemic view has a head start over its rivals. The gap is widened by each rival theory's specific disadvantages, many of them related to higher-order vagueness. The epistemic view is then strengthened by an explanation of our ignorance in borderline cases. The explanation predicts higher order vagueness.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
- Publisher:
- Wiley-Blackwell
- Journal:
- Philosophy and Phenomenological Research More from this journal
- Volume:
- 57
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 921-928
- Publication date:
- 1997-12-01
- EISSN:
-
1933-1592
- ISSN:
-
0031-8205
- Language:
-
English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:12a303c4-17f0-4db3-b752-4857bc96913a
- Local pid:
-
ora:5028
- Deposit date:
-
2011-02-21
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- International Phenomenological Society
- Copyright date:
- 1997
- Notes:
- The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. Citation: Williamson, T. (1997). 'Précis of 'Vagueness'', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57(4), 921-928. N.B. Prof Williamson is now based at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford.
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