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Restricted preference domains in social choice: two perspectives

Abstract:

Preference aggregation is a challenging task: Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem [1] tells us that there is no perfect voting rule. One of the best-known ways to circumvent this difficulty is to assume that voters’ preferences satisfy a structural constraint, such as, e.g., being single-peaked. Indeed, under this assumption many impossibility results in social choice disappear. Restricted preference domains also play an important role in computational social choice: for instance, there are ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1007/978-3-319-99660-8_2

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS Division
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Balliol College
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Springer International Publishing Publisher's website
Volume:
11059
Pages:
12-18
Series:
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Publication date:
2018-08-27
Acceptance date:
2018-06-19
DOI:
ISSN:
0302-9743
Pubs id:
pubs:921074
URN:
uri:0ff6f130-5051-43b4-8fff-b64a907b1024
UUID:
uuid:0ff6f130-5051-43b4-8fff-b64a907b1024
Local pid:
pubs:921074
ISBN:
9783319996592

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