Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts

Journal article

Abstract:: The paper argues that the two best known formal logical fallacies, namely denying the antecedent (DA) and affirming the consequent (AC) are not just basic and simple errors, which prove human irrationality, but rather informational shortcuts, which may provide a quick and dirty way of extracting useful information from the environment. DA and AC are shown to be degraded versions of Bayes' theorem, once this is stripped of some of its probabilities. The less the probabilities count, the closer these fallacies become to a reasoning that is not only informationally useful but also logically valid.

Institution:: "University of Hertfordshire", "University of Oxford"
Oxford college:: St Cross College
Department:: Mathematical,Physical & Life Sciences Division - Computing Laboratory
Role:: Author

Language:: English
Keywords:: Bayes' theorem

rationality

affirming the consequent

formal fallacies

denying the antecedent
Subjects:: Philosophy
UUID:: uuid:0f98478a-9a63-4327-bf26-64b1be11c050
Local pid:: ora:3869
Deposit date:: 2010-06-10
ARK identifier:: ark:/29072/ora_0f98478a9a634327bf2664b1be11c050

Copyright holder:: Springer Science + Business Media B V
Notes:: The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA, but you may be able to access the article via the publisher copy link on this record page. Citation: Floridi, L. (2009). 'Logical fallacies as informational shortcuts', Synthese 167(2), 317-325. [The original article is available at http://www.springerlink.com/content/210g258q21850133/].

Licence:: Terms and Conditions of Use for Oxford University Research Archive

If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record