Journal article
God, physicalism, and the totality of facts
- Abstract:
- The paper offers a general critique of physicalism and of one variety of nonphysicalism, arguing that such theses are untenable. By distinguishing between the absolute conception of reality and the causal completeness of physics it shows that the 'explanatory gap' is not merely epistemic but metaphysical. It defends the essential subjectivity and unity of consciousness and its inseparability from a self-conscious autonomous rational and moral being. Casting a favourable light on dualism freed from misconceptions, it suggests that the only plausible way forward in the search for an understanding of both physical and mental reality is a recognition of the mind as a metaphysically distinct entity.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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(Version of record, bin, 141.2KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1017/S0031819107000137
Authors
- Publisher:
- Cambridge University Press
- Journal:
- Philosophy More from this journal
- Volume:
- 82
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 515-542
- Publication date:
- 2007-10-01
- Edition:
- Publisher's version
- DOI:
- EISSN:
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1469-817X
- ISSN:
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0031-8191
- Language:
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English
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:0f1b7604-0e6f-4ec0-a46e-951ab49feccf
- Local pid:
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ora:2529
- Deposit date:
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2009-01-09
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Royal Institute of Philosophy
- Copyright date:
- 2007
- Notes:
- Citation: Christofidou, A. (2007). 'God, physicalism, and the totality of facts', Philosophy, 82(4), 515-542. [Available at http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJournal?jid=PHI].
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