Journal article
Public policy towards R&D; in oligopolistic industries
- Abstract:
- We consider the free-market and socially optimal outcomes in a general oligopoly model with many firms which first engage in R&D; and then compete in either output or price. Strategic behavior by firms tends to reduce output, R&D;, and welfare and so justifies higher subsidies except when R&D; spillovers are low and firms' actions are strategic substitutes. It also reduces the benefits of R&D; cooperation. Moreover, policies to encourage cooperation are likely to be redundant (since it is always privately profitable) and simulations suggest that the welfare cost of lax competition policy is high.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Authors
- Publisher:
- American Economic Association
- Journal:
- American Economic Review More from this journal
- Volume:
- 87
- Issue:
- 4
- Pages:
- 642-662
- Publication date:
- 1997-09-01
- ISSN:
-
0002-8282
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Subjects:
- UUID:
-
uuid:0d0a0b0d-0b1f-44c8-8ee0-752abb4bf8d0
- Local pid:
-
ora:2141
- Deposit date:
-
2008-06-27
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- American Economic Association
- Copyright date:
- 1997
- Notes:
- N.B. Professor Neary was based at the Department of Economics, University College Dublin when this article was first published. The full-text of this article is not currently available in ORA. Citation: Leahy, D. & Neary, J. P. (1997). 'Public policy towards R&D in oligopolistic industries', American Economic Review, 87(4), 642-662.
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record