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Journal article

Primary auction of slots at European airports

Abstract:
We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
SOGE
Sub department:
Transport Studies Unit
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
SSD
Department:
SOGE
Sub department:
Transport Studies Unit
Role:
Author
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Name:
Economic and Social Research Council
Grant:
RES-000-22-0896
Publisher:
Elsevier
Journal:
Research in Transportation Economics More from this journal
Volume:
45
Pages:
66-71
Publication date:
2014-09-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0739-8859
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:0d005ef3-df4e-417e-a7d2-8060d03c73d2
Local pid:
ora:10598
Deposit date:
2015-03-13

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