Journal article
Primary auction of slots at European airports
- Abstract:
- We use the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction mechanism to propose a system of primary auctions of slots at congested European airports. The system would ensure allocative efficiency and would be incentive-compatible, flexible, understandable, implementable and transparent. Only 10% of slots would be auctioned per year. The current slot coordination mechanism used in Europe, based on historic use of slots, would thus be phased out and disappear within a decade.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.retrec.2014.07.009
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Research in Transportation Economics More from this journal
- Volume:
- 45
- Pages:
- 66-71
- Publication date:
- 2014-09-01
- DOI:
- ISSN:
-
0739-8859
- Language:
-
English
- UUID:
-
uuid:0d005ef3-df4e-417e-a7d2-8060d03c73d2
- Local pid:
-
ora:10598
- Deposit date:
-
2015-03-13
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier Ltd
- Copyright date:
- 2014
- Notes:
- © 2014 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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