Paradigms and russell's resemblance regress

Journal article

Resemblance Nominalism is the view that denies universals and tropes and claims that what makes F-things F is their resemblances. A famous argument against Resemblance Nominalism is Russell's regress of resemblances, according to which the resemblance nominalist falls into a vicious infinite regress. Aristocratic Resemblance Nominalism, as opposed to Egalitarian Resemblance Nominalism, is the version of Resemblance Nominalism that claims that what makes F-things F is that they resemble the F-paradigms. In this paper I attempt to show that a recently advocated strategy to stop Russell's regress by using paradigms does not succeed.

Authors: Rodriguez-Pereyra, G

• Journal: Australasian Journal of Philosophy
• Volume: 82
• Issue: 4
• Pages: 644-651
• Publication date: 2004-01-01
• DOI: 10.1080/713659904
• EISSN: 1471-6828
• ISSN: 0004-8402
• Language: English