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Epistemicism, distribution, and the argument from vagueness

Abstract:

This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic of vagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists about vagueness (at least those who take a broadly Williamsonian line) should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive ...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Publisher copy:
10.1111/nous.12168

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Oxford, HUM, Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
Publisher:
Wiley Publisher's website
Journal:
Nous Journal website
Volume:
52
Issue:
1
Pages:
144-170
Publication date:
2016-08-18
DOI:
EISSN:
1468-0068
ISSN:
0029-4624
URN:
uuid:0c1ca641-341f-4b23-aaeb-4b32d31d31a2
Source identifiers:
626338
Local pid:
pubs:626338

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