Epistemicism, distribution, and the argument from vagueness

Journal article

This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic of vagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists about vagueness (at least those who take a broadly Williamsonian line) should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive question of what, on this framework, it takes for a sentence to be borderline or definite. In the second part of the paper, I apply this result to a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most influential arguments in favour of Universalism about composition is the Lewis‐Sider argument from vagueness. An interesting question, however, is whether epistemicists have any particular reasons to resist the argument. I show that there is no obvious reason why epistemicists should resist the argument but there is a non‐obvious one: the rejection of Distribution argued for in the first part of the paper provides epistemicists with a unique way of resisting the argument from vagueness.

Authors: Magidor, O

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: Wiley
• Journal: Nous
• Volume: 52
• Issue: 1
• Pages: 144-170
• Publication date: 2016-08-18
• Acceptance date: 2016-05-19
• DOI: 10.1111/nous.12168
• EISSN: 1468-0068
• ISSN: 0029-4624