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Rent division, restructuring and managerial risk taking: A strategic bargaining model

Abstract:

This paper demonstrates that, when the manager of a poorly performing firm generates firm-specific rents, strategic considerations associated with anticipated future restructuring may lead to the adoption of risky operating policies. Furthermore, this bias toward risky policies may be exacerbated by increases in managerial entrenchment. This is the case even when the manager does not have an ownership stake in the firm. On the other hand, a manager of a firm that is performing well will prefe...

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Publication date:
1993-01-01
URN:
uuid:0b17ca9c-cc9c-4d4b-acb2-c51bc28428c3
Local pid:
oai:eureka.sbs.ox.ac.uk:1149

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