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Competitive and revenue-optimal pricing with budgets

Abstract:
In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multiple divisible goods. Competitive equilibrium outcomes, and only those, are constrained utilitarian efficient, a notion of utilitarian efficiency that respects buyers' demands and budgets. Our main contribution establishes that, when buyers have linear valuations, competitive equilibrium prices are unique and revenue-optimal for a zero-cost seller.
Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Peer reviewed

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Publisher copy:
10.3982/te5913

Authors

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Role:
Author
More by this author
Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
MPLS
Department:
Computer Science
Oxford college:
Balliol College
Role:
Author
ORCID:
0000-0002-0604-2602


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Funder identifier:
https://ror.org/0439y7842
Grant:
EP/X040461/1


Publisher:
Econometric Society
Journal:
Theoretical Economics More from this journal
Volume:
20
Pages:
1135-1153
Publication date:
2025-04-10
Acceptance date:
2025-04-06
DOI:
EISSN:
1555-7561
ISSN:
1933-6837


Language:
English
Keywords:
Pubs id:
2106294
Local pid:
pubs:2106294
Deposit date:
2025-04-07
ARK identifier:

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