Journal article
Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
- Abstract:
- It is shown that, in infinitely-repeated games between two arbitrarily patient players, strategy profiles with inefficient pure stage-Nash continuations are not strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986). By contrast, a set of strategy profiles similar to the Prisoners' Dilemma's “perfect tit-for-tat” is “uniformly robust to perfect entrants” (Swinkels, 1992), and hence contains a strategically stable set. Moreover, this set satisfies iterated dominance and a version of forward induction, whilst its stable subset is admissible.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 369.5KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.009
Authors
- Publisher:
- Elsevier
- Journal:
- Journal of Economic Theory More from this journal
- Volume:
- 178
- Pages:
- 275-293
- Publication date:
- 2018-09-27
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-09-23
- DOI:
- ISSN:
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0022-0531
- Language:
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English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
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pubs:932013
- UUID:
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uuid:0a97506e-e932-4e3d-b272-df9b5cc5e2ff
- Local pid:
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pubs:932013
- Source identifiers:
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932013
- Deposit date:
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2018-10-25
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Elsevier Inc
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Rights statement:
- Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc.
- Notes:
- This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available online from Elsevier at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.09.009
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