Working paper
Dynamic Voting in Clubs.
- Abstract:
-
This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule a...
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Bibliographic Details
- Publisher:
- Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE - STICERD
- Series:
- STICERD Theoretical Economics Paper Series
- Host title:
- STICERD Theoretical Economics Paper Series
- Publication date:
- 1999-01-01
Item Description
- Language:
- English
- UUID:
-
uuid:09bf0233-826e-48de-bb97-faa5f96f674c
- Local pid:
- oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12043
- Deposit date:
- 2011-08-16
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- Copyright date:
- 1999
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