Dynamic Voting in Clubs.

Working paper

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

Authors: Roberts, K

• Publisher: Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE - STICERD
• Host title: STICERD Theoretical Economics Paper Series
• Series: STICERD Theoretical Economics Paper Series
• Publication date: 1999-01-01
• Language: English