Dysfunctional warfare: the Russian invasion of Ukraine 2022

Journal article

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was based on false premises, faulty assumptions, and a weak strategy. The conduct of operations has also been a failure: a coup de main that miscarried, poor air-land cooperation, inadequate tactical communications, substandard battle discipline, low morale, and vulnerable and weak logistics. As the conflict has unfolded, heavy losses have imposed a strain on available Russian manpower. The Russian army reached a culminating point outside Kyiv and has exhibited little sign of operational learning. By contrast Ukrainians have fought an existential war, making good use of dispersed light infantry tactics with high levels of motivation. Their deficiencies in armaments and munitions have been compensated by Western support. However, the political context continues to impose limitations on the Ukrainians, and, at this early stage of the conflict, the number of options remains constrained.

Authors: Johnson, R

• Publication status: Published
• Peer review status: Peer reviewed
• Publisher: US Army War College Press
• Journal: Parameters
• Volume: 52
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 5-20
• Publication date: 2022-04-23
• Acceptance date: 2022-04-08
• DOI: 10.55540/0031-1723.3144
• ISSN: 0031-1723
• Language: English
• Keywords: dysfunctional warfare; Russia; Volodymyr Zelensky; FFR; Vladimir Putin; Ukraine