Quantity of experience: brain-duplication and degrees of consciousness

Journal article

If a brain is duplicated so that there are two brains in identical states, are there then two numerically distinct phenomenal experiences or only one? There are two, I argue, and given computationalism, this has implications for what it is to implement a computation. I then consider what happens when a computation is implemented in a system that either uses unreliable components or possesses varying degrees of parallelism. I show that in some of these cases there can be, in a deep and intriguing sense, a fractional (non-integer) number of qualitatively identical phenomenal experiences. This, in turn, has implications for what lessons one should draw from neural replacement scenarios such as Chalmers' "Fading Qualia" thought experiment. © Springer Science+Business Media 2006.

Authors: Bostrom, N

• Publication status: Published
• Journal: MINDS AND MACHINES
• Volume: 16
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 185-200
• Publication date: 2006-05-01
• DOI: 10.1007/s11023-006-9036-0
• EISSN: 1572-8641
• ISSN: 0924-6495
• Language: English
• Keywords: implementation; Chalmers; consciousness; duplication; deterministic; Searle; probabilistic; mind; program; computation; fading qualia