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Learning to Forgive.

Abstract:

The Folk Theorem for infinitely repeated games o®ers an embarrassment of riches; nowhere is equilibrium multiplicity more acute. This paper selects amongst these equilibria in the following sense. If players learn to play an infinitely repeated game using classical hypothesis testing, it is known that their strategies almost always approximate equilibria of the repeated game. It is shown here that if, in addition, they are sufficiently "conservative" in adopting their hypotheses, then almost ...

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Publisher:
Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
Series:
Discussion paper series
Publication date:
2006-01-01
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:06fd53ec-4d62-439b-874b-c86719275b6f
Local pid:
ora:1335
Deposit date:
2011-08-16

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