Optimal Stalling When Bargaining.

Journal article

This paper analyzes an alternating offer model of bargaining over the sale of an asset in a market, such as that for housing, in which another agent may come and compete for the right to strike a deal. The analysis allows the buyer and seller to have possibly differing views as to how likely such competition is. Hence the buyer and seller disagree about their respective bargaining powers. These views adjust to market realizations as the parties learn. It is shown that there exists a unique Su...

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Authors: Thanassoulis, J

• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
• Volume: 34
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 101 - 120
• Publication date: 2010-02-01
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.05.003
• ISSN: 0165-1889
• Language: English