Thesis icon

Thesis

Essays in microeconomics

Abstract:

This thesis consists of two theoretical chapters, focusing on dynamic games, and one empirical chapter. In Chapter 1, I consider a repeated game in which, due to imperfect monitoring, no collusion can be sustained. I add a self-interested monitor who commits to generating an imperfect private signal of firms’ actions and sends a public message. The monitor makes an offer specifying the precision of the signal generated and the amount to be paid in return. I show that with low monitoring co...

Expand abstract

Actions


Access Document


Files:

Authors


More by this author
Department:
Toulouse School of Economics
Role:
Author

Contributors

Department:
University of Oxford
Role:
Supervisor
Department:
Queen Mary University
Role:
Supervisor
More from this funder
Grant:
ES/J500112/1
Funding agency for:
Anna Sanktjohanser
Type of award:
DPhil
Level of award:
Doctoral
Awarding institution:
University of Oxford

Terms of use


Metrics


Views and Downloads






If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record

TO TOP