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Interests and 'Independence': The European Central Bank and the Theory of Bureaucracy.

Abstract:

The European Central Bank has an unprecedented degree of statutory independence. This is presumably attributable to the view that central banks, unimpeded by external forces, pursue the public interest. That presumption has not always been common in the economics literature, even in the discussion of central banking. The theory of bureaucracy suggests that such institutions pursue their own interests. It is here applied to the European central bank as it was in the past to other central banks...

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Publisher:
Taylor and Francis
Journal:
International Review of Applied Economics More from this journal
Volume:
16
Issue:
1
Pages:
51 - 69
Publication date:
2002-01-01
DOI:
ISSN:
0269-2171
Language:
English
UUID:
uuid:055afae8-163b-4808-bae0-3a24c759270d
Local pid:
oai:economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk:12670
Deposit date:
2011-08-15

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