Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.

Journal article

Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary dynamics on infinite strategy spaces. Econ. Theory 17, 141-162] provide conditions for the stability of rest points under the replicator dynamics. Here, conditions are given for the stability of sets of strategies under this process.

Authors: Norman, T

• Publisher: Elsevier
• Journal: Games and Economic Behavior
• Volume: 62
• Issue: 2
• Pages: 610 - 627
• Publication date: 2008-01-01
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.05.005
• ISSN: 0899-8256
• Language: English