Conference item
The foul adversary: formal models
- Abstract:
- In classical notions of privacy in computer security, users attempt to keep their data private. A user that is bribed, extorted or blackmailed (i.e., coerced) may not do so. To get a general model of coercion, we strengthen the Dolev-Yao adversary with the ability to coerce others, to the foul adversary. We show that, depending on the setting, subtly different abilities should be assigned to the adversary – whereas existing approaches are one-size-fits-all. The variations of the foul adversary are formalised and we provide a hierarchical relation in their strength. We further interpret the adversary models using several examples.
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
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Access Document
- Files:
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(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 623.6KB, Terms of use)
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- Publisher copy:
- 10.1007/978-3-030-02450-5_3
Authors
- Publisher:
- Springer
- Host title:
- 20th International Conference on Formal Engineering Methods, 12-16 November 2018 - Gold Coast, Australia
- Journal:
- ICFEM More from this journal
- Volume:
- 11232
- Pages:
- 37-53
- Series:
- Lecture Notes in Computer Science
- Publication date:
- 2018-10-11
- Acceptance date:
- 2018-06-29
- DOI:
- ISBN:
- 9783030024499
- Pubs id:
-
pubs:864582
- UUID:
-
uuid:03a78cba-59d9-44c3-8527-7f5b68cb02e7
- Local pid:
-
pubs:864582
- Source identifiers:
-
864582
- Deposit date:
-
2018-07-05
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018
- Copyright date:
- 2018
- Notes:
- © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2018. This is the author accepted manuscript following peer review version of the article. The final version is available online from Springer at: 10.1007/978-3-030-02450-5_3
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