De Re A Priori Knowledge

Journal article

Suppose a sentence of the following form is true in a certain context: 'Necessarily, whenever one believes that the F is uniquely F if anything is, and x is the F, one believes that x is uniquely F if anything is'. I argue that almost always, in such a case, the sentences that result when both occurrences of 'believes' are replaced with 'has justification to believe', 'knows', or 'knows a priori' will also be true in the same context. I also argue that many sentences of the relevant form are true in ordinary contexts, and conclude that a priori knowledge of contingent de re propositions is a common and unmysterious phenomenon. However, because of the pervasive context-sensitivity of propositional attitude ascriptions, the question what it is possible to know a priori concerning a given object will have very different answers in different contexts. © Dorr 2012.

Authors: Dorr, C

• Publication status: Published
• Journal: MIND
• Volume: 120
• Issue: 480
• Pages: 939-991
• Publication date: 2011-10-01
• DOI: 10.1093/mind/fzr091
• EISSN: 1460-2113
• ISSN: 0026-4423
• Language: English