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De Re A Priori Knowledge

Abstract:

Suppose a sentence of the following form is true in a certain context: 'Necessarily, whenever one believes that the F is uniquely F if anything is, and x is the F, one believes that x is uniquely F if anything is'. I argue that almost always, in such a case, the sentences that result when both occurrences of 'believes' are replaced with 'has justification to believe', 'knows', or 'knows a priori' will also be true in the same context. I also argue that many sentences of the relevant form are ...

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Publication status:
Published

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Publisher copy:
10.1093/mind/fzr091

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Division:
HUMS
Department:
Philosophy Faculty
Role:
Author
Journal:
MIND
Volume:
120
Issue:
480
Pages:
939-991
Publication date:
2011-10-01
DOI:
EISSN:
1460-2113
ISSN:
0026-4423
Source identifiers:
195054
Language:
English
Pubs id:
pubs:195054
UUID:
uuid:027610dd-0681-4b6a-88a5-72e8e9b4f58b
Local pid:
pubs:195054
Deposit date:
2012-12-19

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