Conference item
MPC-friendly commitments for publicly verifiable covert security
- Abstract:
- We address the problem of efficiently verifying a commitment in a two-party computation. This addresses the scenario where a party P1 commits to a value đť‘Ą to be used in a subsequent secure computation with another party P2 that wants to receive assurance that P1 did not cheat, i.e. that đť‘Ą was indeed the value inputted into the secure computation. Our constructions operate in the publicly verifiable covert (PVC) security model, which is a relaxation of the malicious model of MPC appropriate in settings where P1 faces a reputational harm if caught cheating. We introduce the notion of PVC commitment scheme and indexed hash functions to build commitments schemes tailored to the PVC framework, and propose constructions for both arithmetic and Boolean circuits that result in very efficient circuits. From a practical standpoint, our constructions for Boolean circuits are 60Ă— faster to evaluate securely, and use 36Ă— less communication than baseline methods based on hashing. Moreover, we show that our constructions are tight in terms of required non-linear operations, by proving lower bounds on the nonlinear gate count of commitment verification circuits. Finally, we present a technique to amplify the security properties of our constructions that allows to efficiently recover malicious guarantees with statistical security
- Publication status:
- Published
- Peer review status:
- Peer reviewed
Actions
Access Document
- Files:
-
-
(Preview, Accepted manuscript, pdf, 754.0KB, Terms of use)
-
- Publisher copy:
- 10.1145/3460120.3485375
Authors
- Publisher:
- Association for Computer Machinery
- Host title:
- Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2021)
- Publication date:
- 2021-11-12
- Acceptance date:
- 2021-09-03
- Event title:
- ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
- Event location:
- Online
- Event website:
- https://www.sigsac.org/ccs/CCS2021/
- Event start date:
- 2021-11-15
- Event end date:
- 2021-11-19
- DOI:
- ISBN:
- 978-1-4503-8454-4
- Language:
-
English
- Keywords:
- Pubs id:
-
1196458
- Local pid:
-
pubs:1196458
- Deposit date:
-
2021-09-29
- ARK identifier:
Terms of use
- Copyright holder:
- Agrawal et al.
- Copyright date:
- 2021
- Rights statement:
- © 2021 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
- Notes:
- This paper will be presented at the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS 2021), 15th-19th November 2021, Online. This is the accepted manuscript version of the article. The final version is available from Association for Computer Machinery at: https://doi.org/10.1145/3460120.3485375
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