Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances—there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one’s religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationalit...Expand abstract
- Publication status:
- Peer review status:
- Reviewed (other)
- Accepted Manuscript
- Publisher copy:
- Copyright holder:
- Lizzie Fricker
- Copyright date:
Copyright © 2014 Lizzie Fricker. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press.
Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy?
If you are the owner of this record, you can report an update to it here: Report update to this record