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Epistemic trust in oneself and others – an argument from analogy?

Abstract:

Richard Foley and others have recently argued that there is an a priori connection between rational trust in one’s own faculties to rational trust of other human persons. This chapter argues, to the contrary, that we must instead establish through empirical observation which others are to be trusted and under which circumstances—there is no rational presumption of the trustworthiness of others. Hence, insofar as one’s religious beliefs are based on trust in the testimony of others, rationalit...

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Publication status:
Published
Peer review status:
Reviewed (other)
Version:
Accepted Manuscript

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Institution:
University of Oxford
Department:
Faculty of Philosophy

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Role:
Editor
Role:
Editor
Publisher:
Oxford University Press Publisher's website
Pages:
174-203
Host title:
Faith, evidence and intellectual virtue
DOI:
URN:
uuid:0007f339-41a1-4132-84c0-e78e25364776
Local pid:
PHILOSOPHY:6
ISBN:
978–0–19–967215–8
Language:
English
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Subjects:

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